We often unnecessarily esteem (or fear) what we do not know. Sometimes it’s related to race or culture…and other times to ideas and concepts. For many people, philosophy holds such a distinction. When someone is identified as a philosopher, assumptions are formed as to the depth of their thought and thereby authority to speak knowingly on certain subjects. Sometimes it’s warranted. Other times it is not. We see a similar trend with neuroscience today. Two fairly recent argue present the challenge: Seeing is believing: The effect of brain images on judgments of scientific reasoning: “…part of the fascination, and the credibility, of brain imaging research lies in the persuasive power of the actual brain images themselves. We argue that brain images are influential because they provide a physical basis for abstract cognitive processes, appealing to people’s affinity for reductionistic explanations of cognitive phenomena.”
…and The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations : “Even irrelevant neuroscience information in an explanation of a psychological phenomenon may interfere with people’s abilities to critically consider the underlying logic of this explanation. ”
Does this explain the willingness for many people to accept the crockus as a part of the brain?
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There’s more about the crockus (spoiler: it’s a hoax):
http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/004989.html
George,
Good points BUT the follow on question then is how to we develop a research methodology that engages research into learning along multiple fronts - including neuroscience? Including anthropology, including economics, including biology, psychiatry and so on?
Mark